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THE CAPE WIND OFFSHORE  
WIND ENERGY PROJECT:  
A CASE STUDY OF THE  
DIFFICULT TRANSITION TO 
RENEWABLE ENERGY 
KENNETH KIMMELL, ESQ. 
DAWN STOLFI STALENHOEF, ESQ. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The BP Gulf disaster gave us pause for many reasons, including the 
tragic loss of human life, the untold impacts to natural resources and the 
environment, the exposure of numerous shortcomings related to our 
piecemeal regulatory system, the discord between state and federal 
oversight, and corporate cost savings measures implemented at the 
expense of safety and sound engineering. The events that unfolded in the 
Gulf of Mexico, before the eyes of world, were a harsh reminder of the 
global imperative to minimize reliance on fossil fuels for our energy 
needs. 
This article presents the story of one renewable energy alternative 
 Kenneth Kimmell served as general counsel to the Massachusetts Executive Office of Energy and 
Environmental Affairs from 2007 to 2011, was responsible for overseeing the state permitting of the 
Cape Wind project, and was a liaison for the state with respect to the federal permitting of the 
project. Mr. Kimmell now serves as the Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of 
Environmental Protection. 
 Dawn Stolfi Stalenhoef has practiced environmental law in Massachusetts for eleven years, and has 
worked in both the public and private sectors. She currently serves as Counsel for the Massachusetts 
Department of Public Utilities. Before becoming an attorney, Ms. Stolfi Stalenhoef worked in the 
consulting field as an environmental scientist. 
The views expressed here are the authors’ personal views, and not necessarily the views of the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts. 
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that is available wherever the wind blows strong and steady. If that alone 
is not sufficient enticement to read further, the authors also promise to 
present one of the most engaging permitting sagas ever known to this 
field. Indeed, the Cape Wind Energy project was held captive by the 
permitting process for nearly a decade – in stark contrast to numerous 
offshore oil projects – due to the imposition of disproportionally rigorous 
regulatory scrutiny and the dogged political pressure applied by a few 
wealthy homeowners with ocean views in the direction of the proposed 
wind farm. 
As we collectively consider “new priorities,” renewable offshore 
energy projects like Cape Wind should be at the top of our list. The 
experience of Cape Wind in navigating the rough seas of state and 
federal permitting, and in many cases blazing a trail for future project 
proponents, is as instructive as it is compelling. 
This article addresses Cape Wind, the nation’s first offshore wind 
energy project proposed for Nantucket Sound in federal waters adjacent 
to Massachusetts. Part I provides an overview of the project and its 
importance and describes its long and complicated permitting path. Part 
II analyzes how the Cape Wind experience highlights flaws in the federal 
permitting process and offers recommendations for remedying those 
flaws. Part III describes the complex jurisdictional issues that Cape Wind 
faced because the wind turbines are proposed to be located in federal 
waters, while the electric cables that transmit the electricity to the 
mainland would lie in the seabed of state waters. Part III also analyzes 
the federal and state court opinions, and relevant statutory authority, that 
ultimately resolved the jurisdictional disputes. Part IV concludes with a 
brief summary of Cape Wind’s long-term prospects. 
II.  THE PERMITTING OF CAPE WIND 
Lately it occurs to me, what a long, strange trip it’s been.1 
A.  WHY CAPE WIND MATTERS 
If completed, the Cape Wind offshore wind energy project would be 
one of the largest offshore wind farms in the world. The project is also 
one of the most significant greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction measures in 
our nation. It would reduce GHG emissions by an estimated 730,000 tons 
 1 GRATEFUL DEAD, Truckin’, on AMERICAN BEAUTY (Warner Bros. 1970). 
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per year, which is the equivalent of taking 175,000 cars off the road each 
year.2 
Due to its size, novelty, and colorful permitting history, the project 
has become a symbol of the United States’ resolve to take action to 
reduce its greenhouse gas emissions and its dependence on fossil fuels. 
However, if the project is not constructed, either because of the aesthetic 
concerns of tenacious beachfront property owners who oppose the 
project or because of its large up-front costs, the world may well begin to 
question the United States’ commitment to doing its part to avert climate 
change. 
The project is a bellwether for the nascent offshore wind industry. 
The Cape Wind developers have invested over $40 million3 and pursued 
the necessary permits for almost ten years. If Cape Wind never comes to 
fruition, many will question whether the financial markets will be willing 
to invest scarce capital in offshore wind. 
The project also highlights the issue of where to locate wind energy 
facilities. There is an ongoing national debate concerning whether to 
build wind power facilities near “load centers,” i.e., where high 
concentrations of people reside and demand energy. One of the 
advantages of Cape Wind is that it is located only five miles from the 
eastern seaboard, which is densely populated and has high electricity 
demand. In contrast, there is sufficient land available to build wind farms 
of Cape Wind’s size in sparsely populated areas such as the Great Plains. 
However, these areas are typically far away from load centers, which 
inevitably leads to higher transmission costs and line leakage.4 
B.  PERMITTING HISTORY 
The Cape Wind project is proposed for “Horseshoe Shoals” in 
 2 Statement from Ian Bowles, Sec’y, Mass. Exec. Office of Energy & Envtl. Affairs (Mar. 
30, 2007) (announcing that he had signed the Certificate on the Final Environmental Impact Report 
for Cape Wind Project); see also Press Release, Dep’t of Interior, Secretary Salazar Announces 
Approval of Cape Wind Energy Project on Outer Continental Shelf off Massachusetts (Apr. 28, 
2010), available at www.doi.gov/news/doinews/Secretary-Salazar-Announces-Approval-of-Cape-
Wind-Energy-Project-on-Outer-Continental-Shelf-off-Massachusetts.cfm. 
 3 Jim Efstathiou Jr., Salazar Signs Cape Wind Lease, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 6, 
2010), available at www.businessweek.com/news/2010-10-06/salazar-signs-cape-wind-lease-first-
for-u-s-waters.html. 
 4 Ian Bowles, Op-Ed., Home-Grown Power, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2009, at A21; Ian Bowles, 
Sec’y, Mass. Exec. Office of Energy & Envtl. Affairs, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on 
Energy and Mineral Resources and the Subcommittee on Insular Affairs, Oceans and Wildlife 2 
(Mar. 24, 2009), available at www.mass.gov/Eoeea/docs/eea/press/testimony/ 
2009_nat_res_ibowles.pdf. 
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Nantucket Sound, a large body of water bordered by the southern 
beaches of Cape Cod and the islands of Martha’s Vineyard and 
Nantucket.5 The project consists of 130 turbines placed within a twenty-
five-square-mile area.6 The turbines are located in federal waters, 
approximately five miles south of the Cape Cod town of Yarmouth, nine 
miles northeast of Martha’s Vineyard, and thirteen miles north of 
Nantucket.7 The turbines would stand 440 feet tall and generate 
electricity that would be transmitted to the mainland of Cape Cod via 
electric cables buried beneath the seabed.8 The project has a nameplate 
capacity of 468 megawatts of power (about the same amount of 
electricity as a medium-sized natural gas plant). It could supply on 
average roughly 75% of the electricity needs of Cape Cod, Nantucket 
Island and Martha’s Vineyard, or roughly 200,000 homes.9 In 
comparison, the next biggest existing offshore wind facility in the world, 
located offshore in the United Kingdom, has a nameplate capacity of 300 
megawatts.10 
With the important exception of the project opponents, most 
observers agree that Horseshoe Shoals is an ideal location for the 
nation’s first offshore wind facility. Wind speed is the key variable, as 
the energy produced from wind is proportional to the cube of the wind 
speed.11 The wind speeds in Nantucket Sound are high, averaging 19.75 
miles per hour (mph),12 which is considered “outstanding” from a 
technical perspective.13 As compared to onshore wind, the so-called 
“capacity” factor is also high, at 37%. This means that 37% of the time, 
 5 A site map can be found at www.doi.gov/news/doinews/images/CapeWindMap_1.jpg. 
 6 Ian Bowles, Mass. Exec. Office of Energy & Envtl. Affairs, Certificate of the Secretary of 
Environmental Affairs on the Final Environmental Impact Report 2 (Mar. 2007), available at 
www.capewind.org/downloads/feir_cert.pdf [hereinafter FEIR CERT.]. 
 7 Map of Cape Wind Site, Dep’t of Interior, available at 
www.doi.gov/news/doinews/images/CapeWindMap_1.jpg (last visited Apr. 10, 2011). 
 8 DEP’T OF INTERIOR, MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE (NOW BUREAU OF OCEAN 
ENERGY MANAGEMENT, REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT), RECORD OF DECISION, CAPE WIND 
ENERGY PROJECT, HORSESHOE SHOALS, NANTUCKET SOUND 3 (Apr. 2010), available at 
www.doi.gov/news/doinews/upload/Cape-Wind-ROD.pdf [hereinafter RECORD OF DECISION]. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Thanet Offshore Wind Farm, VATTENFALL, available at www.vattenfall.co.uk/en/thanet-
offshore-wind-farm.htm (last updated Mar. 16, 2011). 
 11 DANISH WIND INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, available at 
guidedtour.windpower.org/en/tour/wres/enrspeed.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2011). 
 12 FEIR CERT., supra note 6, at 2-13. 
 13 SUSAN F. TIERNEY, ANALYSIS GROUP, INC., STRATEGIC OPTIONS FOR INVESTMENT IN 
TRANSMISSION IN SUPPORT OF OFFSHORE WIND DEVELOPMENT IN MASSACHUSETTS 2-3 (Dec. 
2009), available at www.analysisgroup.com/uploadedFiles/Publishing/Articles/ 
Strategic_Options_Offshore_Wind_12-01-09.pdf. 
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the wind speeds are optimal for this facility, as compared to 33-34% for 
onshore wind.14 Moreover, the wind blows strongest in Nantucket Sound 
at precisely the times of peak energy demand—on hot summer and cold 
winter days.15 
Because the site is five miles from shore, the turbines would be just 
visible, even on very clear days.16 They would not be visible at all when 
there is ocean fog, for which Nantucket Sound is well-known.17 Despite 
its distance from land, the site is located in shallow waters (depths 
between twelve and fifty feet),18 enabling the facility to use existing 
“monopole” technology, which has already been implemented 
successfully in Europe. In contrast, the technology for installing wind 
turbines in deeper waters is still in an experimental stage.19 
The site at Horseshoe Shoals is not considered an important 
commercial fishery; it is not listed as important habitat for any rare 
marine species, and it is not located within a busy navigational channel.20 
One observer well-versed in offshore wind has commented, “Jim Gordon 
[CEO of Cape Wind] has picked the only good location in the east for a 
wind farm using proven technology.”21 
Notwithstanding the apparent advantages of this site, opposition to 
the project has been fierce. Project opponents included the late Senator 
Edward Kennedy, whose family’s famous compound in Hyannis would 
face the project. Also in opposition are many well-heeled property 
owners, such as Bill Koch, who made a fortune in fossil-fuel-based 
industries and opposes the Cape Wind project on aesthetic grounds. 
Koch and others have funded a nonprofit entity named the Alliance to 
Protect Nantucket Sound (the Alliance), which has reportedly spent more 
 14 Mass. Dep’t of Pub. Utils., DPU 10-54, Decision on Petition of Massachusetts Electric 
Company and Nantucket Electric Company 229 n.181 (Nov. 22, 2010), available at 
www.env.state.ma.us/dpu/docs/electric/10-54/112210dpufnord.pdf. 
 15 Id. at 190. 
 16 See visual simulations contained in a document titled Visual Impact Assessment of 
Revised Layout on Multiple Historic Properties, available at www.boemre.gov/offshore/PDFs/ 
VisualImpactRevised.pdf. 
 17 DEP’T OF INTERIOR, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., REGULATION & ENFORCEMENT, 
CAPE WIND ENERGY PROJECT, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT VOL. 1 5-200 (Jan. 
2008), available at www.boemre.gov/offshore/renewableenergy/DEIS/ 
Volume%20I%20-%20Cape%20Wind%20DEIS/Cape%20Wind%20DEIS.pdf (ocean fog present 
approximately 200 days per year) [hereinafter DEIS]. 
 18 RECORD OF DECISION, supra note 8, at 16. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. at 16-25, 72-74. 
 21 Pers, cv. with Greg Watson, Senior Advisor, Clean Energy Technology, Mass. Exec. 
Office of Energy & Envtl. Affairs, 2010. Greg Watson is also the Chair of Offshore Wind Energy 
Collaborative, which studied Cape Wind. 
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than $15 million over the last ten years,22 opposed the project in 
numerous administrative venues, and filed approximately ten different 
lawsuits – all in its effort to stop the project.23 
The permitting of this project was long, expensive, and gruelingly 
divisive. As mentioned, Cape Wind sought permits for almost ten years 
until they were finally issued in 2010. One reason the permitting was so 
difficult is that Cape Wind was attempting to do something that had 
never been done before in the United States—construct an offshore wind 
farm. But as discussed in more detail below, the delay and expense had 
more to do with the tenacity of the opponents, the multitude of federal 
laws and permit processes and, until recently, the lack of sufficient 
resolve of state and federal regulators to make the necessary choices on a 
timely basis. 
The formal permitting of the project began in 2001, when Cape 
Wind commenced its environmental review under the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the state version of that law, the 
Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act (MEPA).24 At that time, the 
lead federal agency was the Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps), which 
had permitting authority over the project because it involved the 
dredging and filling of federal waters under section 404 of the Clean 
Water Act and the placement of structures under the seabed, which are 
regulated by the Rivers and Harbors Act.25 Massachusetts recognized 
early on that its jurisdiction was limited to the electric cables, which 
would lie in state waters, while the Corps had jurisdiction over both the 
cables and the wind turbines, which were to be located in federal 
waters.26 The one important exception to this was the state Office of 
Coastal Zone Management (CZM), which had the authority under the 
Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA)27 to review the impact of the 
turbines in state waters and determine whether the permitting of the 
turbines would be consistent with Massachusetts’ “enforceable” policies 
governing coastal development.28 The role of the CZMA will be 
 22 Eliza Krigman, Will The Winds Favor Cape Wind?, NAT’L J., Feb. 21, 2009, available at 
nationaljournal.com/magazine/will-the-winds-favor-cape-wind--20090221?mrefid=site_search. 
 23 Author Kimmell’s personal observation. 
 24 National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-4370f (Westlaw 2011); 
Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30, §§ 61-62I (Westlaw 
2011); FEIR CERT., supra note 6, at 3. 
 25 Army Corps of Eng’rs, Cape Wind Energy Project Permit Application Cape Wind 
Associates, LLC, www.nae.usace.army.mil/projects/ma/capewind.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2011). 
 26 FEIR CERT., supra note 6, at 4. 
 27 Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1451-1466 (Westlaw 2011). 
 28 FEIR CERT., supra note 6, at 2. 
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discussed in greater detail in Part II of this Article. 
One early auspicious sign for the project was that the Massachusetts 
MEPA office and the Corps initially agreed to conduct a joint 
environmental review, allowing for coordination of information 
gathering, public comment periods, and timelines for state and federal 
agency action.29 
However, early on the opponents fought back hard. Among other 
things, the opponents’ allies in Congress began a multi-year process of 
throwing roadblock after roadblock in the path of Cape Wind’s 
permitting. In the summer of 2002, Senator Kennedy proposed an 
amendment to an energy bill that would have required a National 
Academy of Sciences study of renewable energy in the outer continental 
shelf to be conducted before any offshore facilities could be permitted.30 
In 2005, an amendment proposed by Senator John Warner (R-Virginia) 
to H.R. 1815 (the Defense Reauthorization Bill) called for a study of how 
wind projects might affect military radar systems,31 despite previous 
studies reportedly having shown it is not a problem.32 If the legislation 
had passed as amended by Senator Warner, there would have been a 
moratorium on the Corps’ review of all offshore wind projects until the 
completion of the study. The purported goal of the legislation was to 
change the process for approving offshore energy projects and prohibit 
projects from moving forward until Congress established new 
regulations.33 Although initially it seemed a curious alliance between 
Warner and Kennedy, it was eventually revealed that Senator Warner 
had family and friends with property on Cape Cod.34 
In 2006, amendments pertaining to Cape Wind were added to the 
 29 FEIR CERT., supra note 6, at 4. 
 30 Mandy Locke, Wind Farm Test Tower Wins Approval, VINEYARD GAZETTE, Aug. 23, 
2002, available at www.mvgazette.com/news/2002/08/23/wind_farm_test_tower.php. 
 31 See generally Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Legislation in the 109th Congress, 
CRS Report for Congress 22 (June 2, 2006), available at  fpc.state.gov/documents/ 
organization/68283.pdf. 
 32 See AWEA Statement on “here we go again,” Anti-wind Amendments in Coast Guard and 
Defense Legislation (Nov. 28, 2005), available at 97.74.195.121/newsroom/releases/ 
AWEA_statement_here_we_go_again_antiwind_112805.html. 
 33 Froma Harrop, Why Liberals are Turning on Ted Kennedy, REAL CLEAR POLITICS (Sept. 
4, 2007), available at www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/09/ 
why_liberals_are_turning_on_te.html; see also Timothy Barmann, Amendment to Defense Bill 
Would Stall Cape Wind Project, THE PROVIDENCE J., Oct.7, 2004, available at johnrsweet.com/ 
personal/Wind/PDF/WarnerAmendmentArticle-20041007.pdf. 
 34 Don Young Makes Sneaky Move to Kill Wind Power Project, SOUTH COAST TODAY, Feb. 
24, 2006, at A14, available at www.southcoasttoday.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/ 
20060224/OPINION/302249924&cid=sitesearch; see also Barmann, supra note 33. 
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U.S. Coast Guard Reauthorization Bill in closed-door sessions (after the 
bills had passed both the full House and Senate, and went to conference 
to reconcile differences between the House and Senate versions of the 
bill). One such amendment, proposed by Congressman Don Young (R-
Alaska), would have required a 1.5 mile buffer between the turbines and 
any shipping and ferry routes, despite the fact that “[t]he current rule on 
offshore oil and gas rigs allows them to be 500 feet from a shipping 
channel [and the] Cape Wind turbines would be at least 1,500 feet from 
the main shipping channel through Nantucket Sound.”35 Another 
amendment, proposed by Senator Ted Stevens (R-Alaska), called for the 
Coast Guard Commandant to review offshore wind projects for 
“navigational safety,” despite the fact that the Coast Guard was already 
consulted on that topic during the NEPA environmental-impact-
statement process. Moreover, Senator Stevens proposed language that 
would have given the Governor of Massachusetts (then Mitt Romney, an 
opponent of Cape Wind) veto power over the project.36 It was reported 
that the proposed language had been offered by Senator Stevens at the 
request of Senator Kennedy.37 
While all of these legislative efforts ultimately failed, they added 
great cost and uncertainty to the project and likely would have achieved 
their desired objective—inducing Cape Wind’s backers to abandon the 
project—but for the tenacity and resilience of Jim Gordon, Cape Wind’s 
CEO. 
Despite these legislative efforts, the state and federal agencies 
continued to make progress in the environmental review of the project. 
 35 Id.; see, e.g., Letter from James S. Gordon to Representative Don Young (Feb. 21, 2006), 
available at www.capewind.org/downloads/ 
Don_Young_022106.pdf. 
 36 Ian Fein, Standoff Ends on Cape Wind, VINEYARD GAZETTE, July 7, 2006, available at 
www.mvgazette.com/article.php?3891; Robert Peltier, Backroom Deals, POWER MAGAZINE, June 
15, 2006, available at www.powermag.com/issues/departments/speaking_of_power/Backroom-
deals_512.html; see, e.g., House Report on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2006, 
§§ 404, 414, H.R. Rep. No. 109-413, at 20-21, 25-26 (2006), reprinted in 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. 579, 
available at www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-109hrpt413/pdf/CRPT-109hrpt413.pdf. 
 37 Tina Seeley, White House Opposes Law Killing Wind-Power Project (Update1), 
BLOOMBERG, (May 5, 2006), available at www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid= 
newsarchive&sid=aS0zVljTeVr0 (noting comments by Cape Wind spokesman, Mark Rodgers); 
Kevin Dennehy & David Schoetz, White House Opposes Move to Scrap Cape Wind, CAPE COD 
TIMES, May 6, 2006, available at www.capecodonline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/ 
20060506/NEWS01/305069946&cid=sitesearch; Cape Wind and Pork-Barrel Politics, THE 
WASHINGTON TIMES (May 7, 2006), available at www.washingtontimes.com/news/2006/may/7/ 
20060507-094115-8137r/; Glen Johnson, Romney, Healey, Reilly Criticized on Cape Wind, SOUTH 
COAST TODAY, Feb. 25, 2006, at A03, available at www.southcoasttoday.com/apps/pbcs.dll/ 
article?AID=/20060225/NEWS/302259980&cid=sitesearch. 
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Working cooperatively, the state MEPA office and the Corps prepared a 
“scope” for the joint draft environmental impact report/environmental 
impact statement.38 After an extensive public outreach process, Cape 
Wind was required to assess the project’s impacts on birds, fish and 
marine life, commercial and recreational fishing, visual effects, noise, 
and historical/archeological properties.39 Cape Wind was also tasked 
with identifying alternatives to the project, such as alternative renewable 
energy technologies, a land-based alternative, a shallow-water alternative 
in Nantucket Sound, and a deep-water alternative south of Martha’s 
Vineyard.40 
By 2004, the project had gained some momentum, as the Corps 
released a generally favorable draft environmental impact statement 
(DEIS).41 The project then encountered significant setbacks. 
For some time, opponents of the project had objected on the 
grounds that there had been no underlying formal planning or leasing 
process. Cape Wind had simply located a site, staked a flag on it, as it 
were, and began permitting as if it had the necessary property rights. In 
response, Congress enacted the Energy Policy Act (EPACT), which 
created a leasing process for offshore wind in federal waters.42 Under 
EPACT, the Marine Minerals Service (MMS) of the Department of 
Interior, the federal agency that issues oil and gas leases in the outer 
continental shelf, would also issue leases for offshore wind energy.43 
While this legislation can be deemed a legitimate effort to establish a 
rational and orderly process for federal permitting of offshore wind 
facilities, one might also suspect that the legislation was intended to take 
the permitting authority away from the Corps, which seemed to favor the 
project at that time and had approved a draft environmental impact 
report. 
 38 ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, SCOPE OF WORK, WIND 
POWER FACILITY PROPOSED BY CAPE WIND ASSOCIATES, LLC, available at 
www.nae.usace.army.mil/projects/ma/ccwf/windscope.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2011). See generally 
42 U.S.C.A. § 1501.7 (Westlaw 2011), which defines scoping as “an early and open process for 
determining the scope of issues to be addressed and for identifying the significant issues related to 
the proposed action.” 
 39 ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, supra note 38. 
 40 Id. 
 41 ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, CAPE WIND ENERGY PROJECT, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMPACT STATEMENT, available at www.nae.usace.army.mil/projects/ma/ccwf/deis.htm (last visited 
Apr. 11, 2011). 
 42 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (Aug. 8, 2005), 42 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 15801-16538 (Westlaw 2011). 
 43 For a succinct overview of this statutory change, see Final Rule, Department of the 
Interior, Renewable Energy and Alternate Uses of Existing Facilities on the Outer Continental Shelf, 
74 Fed. Reg. 19,638-39 (Apr. 29, 2009). 
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Although EPACT provided a limited “grandfathering” for Cape 
Wind, the project essentially had to start the federal permitting process 
all over.44 The MMS decided not to accept the DEIS that had been 
prepared by the Corps and to draft its own report instead.45 This alone 
delayed the project for several years. 
In the meantime, state permitting of the project encountered heavy 
resistance led by Governor Romney. On one occasion, Governor 
Romney orchestrated a highly publicized press conference on a Cape 
Cod beach, during which he vowed to stop the project.46 
Under Massachusetts state law, the Energy Facilities Siting Board 
(the Siting Board) has jurisdiction to permit the cables that would 
transmit the electricity from the turbines in federal waters through state 
waters and to the mainland.47 Although the Siting Board had routinely 
approved a number of undersea electric cable projects before, it was 
strangely reluctant to approve this one.48 Permitting of the Cape Wind 
cables, which even the project opponents conceded would have no 
significant adverse environmental impacts, ultimately took over three 
years.49 
The cables were also met with another legal obstacle: Massachusetts 
tidelands law. The Massachusetts Department of Environmental 
Protection’s ambiguous regulations were interpreted to mean that the 
electric cables were not a “water-dependent” use.50 This spelled trouble, 
because the Department’s regulations disallowed licenses for uses in 
 44 Dep’t of Interior, Minerals Management Service (now Bureau of Ocean 
Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement) Office of Public Affairs, Efforts to Reach a 
Decision on the Cape Wind Energy Project, available at www.doi.gov/news/doinews/upload/Fact-
Sheet-Cape-Wind-with-SOL-edits-04-28-10.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2011). See generally the 
Saving Provision of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594, 747 (providing 
that nothing in the Act “requires the resubmittal of any document that was previously submitted or 
the reauthorization of any action that was previously authorized with respect to a project for which, 
before the date of enactment of this Act – (1) an offshore test facility has been constructed; or (2) a 
request for a proposal has been issued by a public authority.”). Cape Wind was “grandfathered” to 
the extent that it was not required to resubmit previously submitted documents; however, it was 
required to submit additional documentation and endure additional scrutiny under an expanded 
federal review. 
 45 Dep’t of Interior, supra note 44. 
 46 Walter Brooks, Run, Romney Run, CAPECODTODAY.COM (Mar. 19, 2005), available at 
www.capecodtoday.com/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=095. 
 47 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164 § 69J (Westlaw 2011). 
 48 Author Kimmell’s personal observation. 
 49 Mass. Energy Facilities Siting Bd., EFSB 02-2, Final Decision on the Matter of the 
Petition of Cape Wind Associates, LLC and Commonwealth Electric Company d/b/a NSTAR 
Electric for Approval to Construct Two 115 kV Electric Transmission Lines (May 11, 2005), 
available at www.mass.gov/Eoca/docs/dte/siting/efsb02-2/cwfp1-67.pdf. 
 50 310 MASS. CODE REGS. 9.12(1)(b) (Westlaw 2011). 
10
Golden Gate University Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 8
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/gguelj/vol5/iss1/8
07_KIMMELL PRINTER VERSION 9/24/2011  6:29:41 PM 
2011] OFFSHORE WIND ENERGY PROJECT 207 
 
submerged tidelands unless the uses were water-dependent.51 In order to 
obtain a license, Cape Wind would need a variance which is time-
consuming and difficult to obtain.52 
By 2005, the project faced a highly uncertain future. However, in 
2006 when Deval Patrick was elected Governor of Massachusetts, the 
tide shifted back in favor of the project. As a candidate, Patrick had 
backed the Cape Wind project.53 And as Governor, he appointed Ian 
Bowles, a strong clean-energy supporter, as his Secretary of the 
Executive Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs.54 
The election results fundamentally changed the landscape of the 
state-level permitting process. In March 2007, Massachusetts approved 
the final environmental impact report,55 which then allowed the state’s 
permitting agencies to issue permits for the cables. In 2008, the state 
revised its tideland regulations to specify that electric cables that connect 
to offshore wind turbines are water-dependent and therefore licensable 
under state tidelands law.56 
However, the project then ran into interference from the Cape Cod 
Commission (Commission), a regional planning agency that shared 
jurisdiction over the electric cables with the state. The Commission was 
clearly reluctant to approve Cape Wind’s electric cables, even though 
they were functionally indistinguishable from other cables in Nantucket 
Sound that bring electricity to the islands of Nantucket and Martha’s 
Vineyard.57 Rather than deny the cables outright, the Commission 
demanded extensive additional information, including information on the 
wind turbines themselves, despite the fact that the turbines were outside 
of the Commission’s jurisdiction.58 The Commission also balked at 
making a decision until the federal environmental review was completed 
even though that review was focused on the turbines outside of the 
 51 310 MASS. CODE REGS. 9.32(1)(a)2 (Westlaw 2011). 
 52 310 MASS. CODE REGS. 9.21 (Westlaw 2011). 
 53 See, e.g., Deval Patrick, Democrat for Governor, Moving Massachusetts Forward, Energy 
Independence and Environmental Stewardship (Oct, 18, 2005), available at 
mehrco.web.officelive.com/Documents/Deval Patrick on municipal utilities.pdf; Jack Coleman, 
Deval Patrick to Endorse Cape Wind, CAPE COD TODAY, Oct. 17, 2005, available at 
www.capecodtoday.com/news259.htm. 
 54 See, e.g., Official Patrick Administration Cabinet Announcement, THE BOSTON GLOBE, 
Dec. 15, 2006, available at www.boston.com/news/globe/city_region/breaking_news/ 
2006/12/official_patric_1.html#. 
 55 FEIR CERT., supra note 6. 
 56 310 MASS. CODE REGS. 9.12(b) (Westlaw 2011). 
 57 Author Kimmell’s personal observation. 
 58 Id. 
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Commission’s jurisdiction.59 When Cape Wind refused to further extend 
the timeline to allow for this additional review, the Commission denied a 
permit for the cables.60 
The project proponents had recourse. Under a law enacted amidst 
the energy crisis of the early 1970’s, the Massachusetts Energy Facilities 
Siting Board had the authority to “override” local denial of an energy 
facility permit and issue a composite permit that covered all the 
necessary approvals under state law.61 The Siting Board—the same 
agency that under Governor Romney had delayed issuing an approval for 
the electric cables for three years —issued a decision in 2009 overriding 
the Commission’s rejection of the project.62 
The permitting at the federal level, however, remained a serious 
obstacle. Although the Cape Wind environmental impact reports dealt 
comprehensively with the issues and demonstrated that Horseshoe Shoals 
was the superior site, federal permitting was delayed for another eighteen 
months due to an expansive historic review process under section 106 of 
the National Historic Preservation Act.63 
Section 106 provides that when a federal action may have a 
significant adverse effect on properties that are listed or eligible for 
listing on the National Historic Register, the federal permitting agency 
(here, the MMS) has to consider the effect of the federal action on such 
properties. The agency must also consult with the State Historic 
Preservation Officer (SHPO) and others whose properties may be 
affected.64 
During the environmental review process, Cape Wind evaluated the 
potential historic impacts of the project as required by state and federal 
authorities. Cape Wind identified twenty-eight properties of historic 
significance along south-facing beaches of Cape Cod and areas in 
Martha’s Vineyard and Nantucket with potential views of the project; 
and then the Minerals Management Service added a twenty-ninth 
property.65 Cape Wind simulated the views of the turbines from locations 
 59 Id. 
 60 Decision of the Cape Cod Commission, Oct. 18, 2007, Development of Regional Impact, 
Project JR 20084. 
 61 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164, § 69K (Westlaw 2011). 
 62 Final Decision, EFSB 07-08. 
 63 16 U.S.C.A. § 470 (Westlaw 2011). 
 64 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 470(a), (f) (Westlaw 2011). 
 65 DEP’T OF INTERIOR, MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE (NOW BUREAU OF OCEAN 
ENERGY MANAGEMENT, REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT), DOCUMENTATION OF SECTION 106 
FINDING OF ADVERSE EFFECT 30, tbl.4.1 (Brandi M. Carrier Jones ed., 2008), available at 
www.boemre.gov/offshore/RenewableEnergy/PDFs/FAE_Final.pdf. 
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representative of these properties.66 In general, the simulations showed 
that on a very clear day, the turbines would be visible at the edge of the 
horizon from the coastal locations on Cape Cod approximately five miles 
away, slightly visible from Martha’s Vineyard locations (nine miles) and 
even less visible from Nantucket (thirteen miles).67 Although it did not 
make sense to move the project to another location to mitigate this 
impact since Horseshoe Shoals was otherwise deemed to be the best site, 
Cape Wind did make efforts to mitigate the impact by reducing the 
number of turbines from 170 to 130. It also modified the location to 
increase the distance from certain historic sites (among them, the 
Kennedy compound in Hyannis).68 
Late in the historic consultation process, a new obstacle was thrown 
in Cape Wind’s path. In 2009, the Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe and the 
Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head petitioned the MMS to find that all of 
Nantucket Sound—a 600-square-mile water body—be deemed eligible 
for listing on the National Register of Historic Properties as a “traditional 
cultural property.”69 The tribes contended that they participated in 
“sunrise ceremonies” in which they viewed the sunrise to the east, and 
listing all of Nantucket Sound on the Register would protect their 
ceremonial views from Cape Wind’s turbines.70 
The MMS rejected this claim, finding that Nantucket Sound met 
none of the criteria for listing. The MMS noted that Cape Wind had 
performed an extensive archeological search of the seabed and found no 
artifacts or other evidence of human habitation. The MMS also cited 
published guidance from the National Register discouraging the listing of 
water bodies, because they typically lack defined boundaries and tight 
connection to a specific cultural practice. Moreover, the MMS found that 
Nantucket Sound itself was not a sacred site; rather, it was the viewshed 
from tribal land over the sound that was important. However, that view 
had been studied during the environmental review process and could be 
addressed without listing all of Nantucket Sound on the National 
Register.71 
 66 Id. at 10-24. 
 67 Id. at 3, fig.2.1 (visual simulations included in the environmental impact statement). 
 68 Press Release, Dept. of the Interior, Secretary Salazar Announces Approval of Cape Wind 
Energy Project on Outer Continental Shelf off Massachusetts (Apr. 28, 2010), available at 
www.doi.gov/news/doinews/Secretary-Salazar-Announces-Approval-of-Cape-Wind-Energy-Project-
on-Outer-Continental-Shelf-off-Massachusetts.cfm. 
 69 Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe 2009-RES-022, Horseshoe Shoal Resolution; Letter from 
Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head to National Park Service (Sept. 17, 2009). 
 70 Id. 
 71 DEP’T OF INTERIOR, MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE (NOW BUREAU OF OCEAN 
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The Massachusetts SHPO, who is not appointed by the Governor, 
appealed the MMS’s determination to the Keeper of the National 
Register. The SHPO argued that all of Nantucket Sound should be listed 
on the register. While noting that no archeological remains had been 
found, the SHPO claimed that this did not matter, because Nantucket 
Sound had once been dry land and it could be expected that “Native 
Americans would have occupied the exposed lands.”72 
In a highly unusual move, the Keeper of the National Register 
accepted the theories of the SHPO, overturned the findings of the MMS, 
and found that all of Nantucket Sound was eligible for listing as a 
traditional cultural property on the National Register.73 
This decision emboldened the project opponents. The consultation 
process came to an impasse when the Wampanoag tribes and the SHPO 
refused to engage in a discussion about mitigation and instead insisted 
that the project start the permitting from scratch at a different location.74 
The impasse required Secretary of Interior, Kenneth Salazar, to refer the 
matter to the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation for a 
recommendation before MMS could issue a decision. 
In April 2010, the Advisory Council issued its decision, 
recommending that the Secretary deny approval of the project.75 The 
Advisory Council opined that views from the twenty-eight historic 
properties would be harmed, because people viewing these sites would 
see turbines on a very clear day at the edge of the horizon.76 The Council 
further feared that installing the foundations in the seabed could harm 
archeological remains, notwithstanding the fact that none had been found 
at the project site. Additionally, the Council credited the tribes’ claim 
that the wind turbines would mar sunrise ceremonies.77 
The Advisory Council’s letter was met with a well-coordinated and 
politically powerful response. The governors of six coastal states 
(Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey, Maryland and 
ENERGY MANAGEMENT, REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT), NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC 
PLACES DETERMINATION OF ELIGIBILITY NOTIFICATION FOR NANTUCKET SOUNDS (Oct. 9, 2009). 
 72 Letter from Brona Simon to Christopher Horrell, at 1 (Nov. 5, 2009). The SHPO also 
relied on the tribe’s history of using the Sound for fishing and navigation, and tribal legends of a 
giant named Maushop, who was said to have created islands within Nantucket Sound and caused 
ocean fog with his pipe. 
 73 DEP’T OF INTERIOR, NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES 
DETERMINATION OF ELIGIBILITY NOTIFICATION FOR NANTUCKET SOUND (Jan. 4, 2010), available at 
www.capecodonline.com/static/pdf/nantucketsound.pdf. 
 74 Author Kimmell’s personal observation. 
 75 www.scribd.com/doc/29625545/Cape-Wind-Comments-by-ACHP. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
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Delaware), all of which were entertaining proposals for offshore wind 
farms, wrote Secretary Salazar to urge rejection of the Council’s 
approach.78 The governors stated, “If the [Council’s] approach to historic 
preservation is adopted, it would establish a precedent that will make it 
difficult, if not impossible, to site offshore wind projects anywhere along 
the eastern seaboard.”79 The governors argued that historic protection 
typically involves preventing the destruction of a historic building, or 
building a new structure in a historic district that is discordant with the 
history.80 Here, however, the Council was calling for the rejection of 
Cape Wind not to protect historic buildings or districts, but to protect 
against views of the wind farm many miles away. 
In April 2010, Secretary Salazar rejected the Council’s 
recommendation and issued a Record of Decision81 that cleared the way 
for the final permits to be issued in late 2010. At a press conference, 
when asked to identify the most important consideration to his decision, 
Secretary Salazar cited the letter from the six governors.82 
Once the permitting was completed, the inevitable lawsuits from 
project opponents followed. The Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound 
filed numerous suits challenging the state approvals. Ultimately, the 
Alliance lost each suit, the state approvals have been affirmed, and all of 
the lawsuits dismissed.83 The Alliance also has filed numerous suits in 
federal court challenging approvals by the MMS.84 Those suits are still 
pending. 
To summarize: Cape Wind first sought its permits in 2001. It took 
almost ten years before the permits were finally issued in late 2010. 
During that time, state regulators were reluctant to permit an otherwise 
routine electric cable, the federal permitting process changed midstream, 
and Cape Wind was essentially required to restart the permitting process 
from scratch. Along the way, numerous attempts were made to kill the 
project legislatively and through litigation. And several federal agencies 
assisted the project opponents in delaying and almost derailing the 
project with unprecedented and expansive notions of historical 
 78 Letter from Governors of Atlantic Coastal States to Ken Salazar, Secretary, Dep’t of 
Interior (Apr. 23, 2010), available at multimedia2.heraldinteractive.com/misc/GovernorsLetter.pdf. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 DEP’T OF INTERIOR, MINERALS MGMT. SERV., RECORD OF DECISION, CAPE WIND ENERGY 
PROJECT, HORSESHOE SHOAL, NANTUCKET SOUND, (April 28, 2010), available at 
www.boemre.gov/offshore/renewableenergy/PDFs/CapeWindROD.pdf. 
 82 Author Kimmell’s personal observation. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
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protection. 
C.  REFORMING THE PERMITTING PROCESS 
The Cape Wind saga reveals that the current permitting process for 
offshore wind energy projects is broken. If the nation is serious about 
developing offshore wind energy projects along its coasts, Congress must 
advance reform. 
One place to look for inspiration, ironically, is Massachusetts. 
Despite its reputation for long and protracted siting battles, 
Massachusetts has instituted two major reforms that could serve as 
models for federal reform of offshore wind-project permitting. 
The first model reform is a “one-stop permitting” law that enables 
the State Energy Facilities Siting Board to issue a single permit and 
eliminates the need for any additional state or local permits.85 Enacted 
during the energy crisis of the early 1970’s, this law ensures that state 
and local agencies do not block power plants and infrastructure needed 
for a reliable energy supply. The law allows the Siting Board to step in 
when an energy project proponent is denied a necessary permit or 
experiences significant delays, including those caused by litigation.86 
The Siting Board has broad representation: it is composed of the 
Executive Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs, the Department 
of Environmental Protection, the Department of Energy Resources, the 
Department of Public Utilities, and three citizen members representing 
labor, environmental, and consumer interests.87 It has wide jurisdiction 
and can review all of the various impacts of energy facilities that would 
be examined by state or local permitting agencies. It may also receive the 
input of all state and local agencies that would otherwise be called upon 
to grant permits.88 This authority ensures that all issues and all possible 
objections are heard once, rather than multiple times by multiple 
agencies. And unlike with most permits issued by state agencies, the 
appeals process is streamlined. Indeed, there is but one appeal of a Siting 
Board approval, which goes directly to the state Supreme Judicial 
Court.89 
As noted above, this law was crucial to the success of Cape Wind’s 
permitting on the state level, because it ensured that the permitting of the 
 85 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164, § 69K (Westlaw 2011). 
 86 Id. 
 87 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164 § 69H (Westlaw 2011). 
 88 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164, §§ 69N, 69O (Westlaw 2011). 
 89 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164 § 69P (Westlaw 2011). 
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electric cables would not get bogged down in other state and local level 
permitting, or be delayed by judicial appeals of such permit decisions. 
Had this law not been in place, it is likely that Cape Wind would still be 
in litigation with the Cape Cod Commission over its denial of the electric 
cables and would be defending the license issued by the Department of 
Environmental Protection allowing the cables to be placed in 
Massachusetts’ tidelands. 
There is no comparable “one-stop permitting” option for offshore 
wind projects available at the federal level. While the EPACT 
established that the MMS (now referred to as the Bureau of Ocean 
Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement, or BOEMRE) plays 
the leading-agency role for issuance of an offshore lease, numerous other 
federal agencies such as the Army Corps of Engineers, Environmental 
Protection Agency, Federal Aviation Administration, and the Coast 
Guard will still need to issue separate approvals for the project. Federal 
agencies, including the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, National Park 
Service, and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, will also 
play significant “consultative” roles. Rather than having the appeals of 
the permits lodged in one court, federal law provides for multiple appeals 
in various federal courts that will have to be resolved before the project 
can finally proceed. This multiplicity of permitting and consultative 
agencies, and numerous potential judicial appeals, is a formula for delay, 
confusion, redundancy, and inconsistency. In short, it is a boon for the 
forces of inertia. 
A second key reform in Massachusetts occurred after Cape Wind 
entered the scene. Some objected to Cape Wind’s proposal because there 
was no planning process that preceded the project. Instead, as noted, 
Cape Wind essentially staked out its ground and then requested permits. 
To reform this so-called “ad hoc” approach, the Massachusetts 
legislature passed the Oceans Act of 2008.90 The Act directed the 
Secretary of Energy and Environmental Affairs to prepare an ocean plan 
to govern the uses of Massachusetts’ coastal waters.91 Among other 
things, the Act allowed for offshore wind facilities to be constructed in 
Massachusetts waters, provided they are of “appropriate scale” and are 
consistent with the plan.92 
 90 2008 Mass. Acts 114. 
 91 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21A § 4C (Westlaw 2011). 
 92 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 132A § 15(2)(b) (Westlaw 2011); see, e.g., Press Release, 
Mass. Exec. Office of Energy & Envtl. Affairs, Patrick Administration Releases Final Blueprint for 
Managing Development in State Waters (Jan. 4, 2010), available at 
www.mass.gov/?pageID=eoeeapressrelease&L=1&L0=Home&sid=Eoeea&b=pressrelease&f=1001
04_pr_ocean_plan&csid=Eoeea (“Under the Ocean Act and the ocean management plan, the concept 
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To devise the plan, the Secretary empanelled two stakeholder 
advisory groups, held approximately eighty public hearings in coastal 
communities, and collected extensive data on the current uses of the 
coastal waters. In addition, the Secretary identified areas containing 
important commercial and recreational fisheries, significant marine 
mammal habitats, navigational channels and rare bird habitats.93 All of 
this data was layered in GIS mapping systems that graphically depicted 
the areas where offshore wind turbines should not be located so as to 
avoid conflict with competing uses. The mapping revealed that there 
were two large areas not encumbered by these incompatible uses; an area 
southwest of Martha’s Vineyard, and an area to the west of the small 
town of Gosnold.94 The plan provides that a commercial-scale offshore 
wind facility is “presumptively” appropriate in these areas and entitled to 
state permits.95 While any project in these areas would still need to 
obtain state and local permits, the permits would be a mechanism to 
impose conditions upon the use, rather than deny it altogether.96 In 
essence, the ocean plan is akin to the zoning of coastal waters, such that 
the designation of certain areas within the coastal waters creates “zones” 
where wind energy can be pursued as of right (e.g., without the need for 
a permit or variance).97 
The advantages of a planning/zoning model over ad hoc permitting 
are manifest. The planning/zoning process is deliberate and involves the 
public in decision-making. The process encourages the examination of a 
wide range of alternative sites and is designed to select the best locations. 
Once the best locations are selected, the developer is assured of a 
of ‘appropriate scale’ includes such factors as protecting interests associated with fishing, fowling 
and navigation; insuring public safety; and minimizing incompatibility with existing uses and visual 
impacts.”); see also Massachusetts Ocean Management Plan, ch. 2, tbl.2-2 (Dec. 2009) (providing a 
list of factors to be used by regional planning authorities in defining the “appropriate scale” of a 
proposed wind energy project). 
 93 Ian Bowles, Sec’y, Mass. Exec. Office of Energy & Envtl. Affairs, Cover Letter to Final 
Massachusetts Ocean Plan (Dec. 31, 2009), available at www.env.state.ma.us/eea/mop/final-v1/v1-
front.pdf. 
 94 MASS. EXEC. OFFICE OF ENERGY & ENVTL. AFFAIRS, MASSACHUSETTS OCEAN 
MANAGEMENT PLAN 2-1 to 2-3, Figure 2-1 (Dec. 2009), available at www.env.state.ma.us/eea/mop/ 
final-v1/v1-complete.pdf. 
 95 MASS. EXEC. OFFICE OF ENERGY & ENVTL. AFFAIRS, MASSACHUSETTS OCEAN MANAGEMENT 
PLAN 2-1 through 2-3 (Dec. 2009), available at www.env.state.ma.us/eea/mop/final-v1/v1-
complete.pdf; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 132A § 18 (Westlaw 2011) (once the plan is 
issued, all permitting must be consistent with the plan). 
 96 MASS. EXEC. OFFICE OF ENERGY & ENVTL. AFFAIRS, MASSACHUSETTS OCEAN 
MANAGEMENT PLAN 2-2 (Dec. 2009), available at www.env.state.ma.us/eea/mop/final-v1/v1-
complete.pdf. 
 97 See, e.g., Massachusetts Ocean Management Plan, ch. 2. 
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predictable outcome. 
The federal government’s process, in contrast, is still driven by the 
project proponent’s individual choice of sites. While there is now a 
leasing process administered by BOEMRE, the primary function of 
BOEMRE is to select a lessee that offers the best financial bid.98 There is 
no statutory ocean planning authority under federal law with an agency 
empowered to make zoning/planning designations of appropriate sites for 
offshore wind projects. Nor is there any process to assure developers that 
if they select certain sites and abide by known performance standards, 
they will receive a permit.99 
Thus, the Cape Wind experience both highlights the need for reform 
and provides models for the types of reform that are needed. 
III. STATE VERSUS FEDERAL JURISDICTION – A COMPLEX 
ISSUE 
The sea is no one’s private property; rather it is a commons that 
belongs to all the people, through ownership by the respective coastal 
States extending three miles from shore.100 
Future proposals for offshore energy projects will likely trigger both 
federal and state jurisdiction. As was the case with Cape Wind, even 
where a turbine installation is located in federal waters, invariably the 
power will need to be brought to shore via transmission lines running 
through state waters. When this happens, determining jurisdiction over 
the project and its corresponding permitting requirements can be 
challenging. Again, Cape Wind’s experience with this arduous process is 
instructive. This section provides an overview of the statutory and 
common-law framework governing offshore wind projects, and it 
analyzes how the jurisdictional issues regarding Cape Wind were 
resolved by the federal and state courts. 
 98 Final Rule, Department of the Interior, Renewable Energy and Alternate Uses of Existing 
Facilities on the Outer Continental Shelf, 74 Fed. Reg. 19,638-39 (Apr. 29, 2009). 
 99 However, President Obama has issued an executive order to establish ocean planning 
similar to Massachusetts’ ocean plan. Jim Tankersley, Obama to Launch Ocean Initiative, L.A. 
TIMES, July 19, 2010, available at articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/19/nation/la-na-obama-ocean-
20100719. It remains to be seen what, if any, regulatory significance will attach to this plan, once 
completed. 
 100 Mass. Office of Coastal Zone Mgmt., The Ocean as a Public Trust Resource, available at 
www.mass.gov/czm/oceanmanagement/waves_of_change/pdf/trpt.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2011). 
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A.  STATE AND FEDERAL JURISDICTION OVER THE OCEAN 
i.   Federal Statutory Authority 
The Submerged Lands Act (SLA) of 1953101 was enacted in 
response to a U.S. Supreme Court case that had transferred land 
historically under the control of states into the hands of the federal 
government. Resolution of the dispute would determine who had title to 
coastal lands containing valuable oil and mineral deposits. In United 
States v. California (1947), the Court adopted the federal government’s 
view that its responsibility for national defense and international 
relations concerns gave rise to title that was paramount to the rights of 
California to the underwater lands located three miles seaward of its 
shoreline.102 Congress objected to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
coastal rights and passed the SLA to affirm the states’ full title to the 
seabed (i.e., “lands beneath navigable waters”) within three geographical 
miles of their shores.103 
Pressure for oil and gas exploration rights was also the impetus for 
passage of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA).104 The 
OCSLA defines the bounds of federal waters beyond the three-mile SLA 
zone.105 It makes the Constitution, laws, and civil and political 
jurisdiction of the United States fully applicable to the Outer Continental 
Shelf (OCS) and establishes national rules for the leasing and 
development of natural resources in the seabed outside of state territory. 
The OCSLA also provides a federal cause of action for any person 
aggrieved by a violation of those rules and vests jurisdiction to hear such 
cases in the federal district courts.106 
ii.  Federal Litigation 
In 2002, members of the Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, 
through Ten Taxpayers,107 sued Cape Wind in state court claiming that it 
had failed to obtain necessary state permits before erecting a data 
 101 43 U.S.C.A. § 1301 et seq. (Westlaw 2011). 
 102 United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947). 
 103 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301, 1311, 1312 (Westlaw 2011) (with few exceptions). 
 104 43 U.S.C.A. § 1331 et seq. (Westlaw 2011). 
 105 43 U.S.C.A. § 1331(a) (Westlaw 2011). 
 106 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1333(a)(1), 1337, 1349(a)(1), (b) (Westlaw 2011). 
 107 Ten Taxpayers Citizen Grp. v. Cape Wind Assocs., LLC, 278 F. Supp. 2d 98 (D. Mass. 
2003). 
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collection tower in Nantucket Sound, and seeking an injunction to 
prevent construction of the data tower. Cape Wind removed the case to 
federal court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction, and the Ten 
Taxpayers plaintiffs moved to remand. They claimed that state 
jurisdiction relied on authority granted to Massachusetts under federally 
delegated power to regulate fisheries and fish habitats through the 
Magnuson-Stevens Act, which requires state approval for structures 
erected in the Nantucket Sound seabed. They further contended that this 
authority applied broadly and included any activity that affected fishing 
in Nantucket Sound. Cape Wind filed a motion to dismiss, attaching two 
letters from the Massachusetts Department of Environmental 
Management (the agency possessing the relevant regulatory authority) in 
which the agency disclaimed authority over activities in Horseshoe 
Shoals, and arguing that the Ten Taxpayers plaintiffs lacked standing to 
assert authority on behalf of the state. On August 19, 2003, the district 
court granted Cape Wind’s motion, holding that although Congress had 
delegated authority to regulate fisheries in Nantucket Sound to 
Massachusetts, it was a specific grant of authority and not general 
regulatory authority over all “environmental disturbances that could 
impact fishing.”108 No state permits were required where there was no 
state authority to permit the data tower. 
 On appeal, the Ten Taxpayers plaintiffs argued that there was a 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, so the district court should have 
remanded, and they also appealed the dismissal of their complaint. 
The First Circuit decided the appeal in 2004. The court noted that 
“[t]his case implicates the complex and rather obscure body of law that 
divides regulatory authority over Nantucket Sound between the state and 
federal governments.”109 The court recounted the legislative and 
adjudicatory history that established the jurisdictional divide as it stands 
today, noting that the OCSLA represents “a sweeping assertion of federal 
supremacy over the submerged lands outside the three-mile SLA 
boundary,” and that subsequent case law has confirmed this authority.110 
In 1976, the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and 
Management Act (Magnuson-Stevens Act) established that “exclusive 
fishery management authority” in the OCS rests with the federal 
 108 Ten Taxpayers, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 101. 
 109 Ten Taxpayer Citizens Grp. v. Cape Wind Assocs., LLC, 373 F.3d 183 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 110 Id. at 188; see also United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515, 522, 524 (1975) (“control and 
disposition” of the seabed is “the business of the Federal Government rather than the States,” and 
“paramount rights to the offshore seabed inhere in the Federal Government as an incident of national 
sovereignty”). 
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government.111 It also preserved the authority granted to the states to 
regulate resources, including fisheries, within the three-mile SLA 
boundary.112 To further complicate matters of jurisdiction, the geography 
of Nantucket Sound is such that almost the entirety of the Sound 
(excepting its center portion, which includes Horseshoe Shoals) is 
encompassed by Massachusetts’ three-mile territorial sea.113 
Although it is true that the U.S. Supreme Court has confirmed that 
the area beyond three miles from any Massachusetts shore is outside the 
state’s jurisdiction,114 Congress also passed legislation that expanded 
Massachusetts’ authority over the entire Nantucket Sound for the 
purposes of the Magnuson-Stevens Act.115 The Ten Taxpayers plaintiffs 
argued that the expanded jurisdiction under the Magnuson-Stevens Act, 
which allows Massachusetts to regulate fisheries concerns in the entire 
Nantucket Sound, also gives rise to broader state authority to regulate 
construction of Cape Wind’s data tower in Horseshoe Shoals.116 
Relying on language in the OCSLA, the court affirmed federal 
question jurisdiction in that the OCSLA subsumes all state law (to the 
extent it is “applicable and not inconsistent”) as if it were federal law, to 
fill in any gaps that may exist in regulating the OCS.117 Therefore, the 
Ten Taxpayers plaintiffs’ claims, “though ostensibly premised on 
Massachusetts law, arise under the ‘law of the United States’ under § 
1333(a)(2).”118 Regarding their substantive claim as to the relevance of 
Massachusetts regulations to activity in Horseshoe Shoals, the court 
readily found that there was no basis for such regulation regarding the 
activity proposed. 
In our view, the OCSLA leaves no room for states to require licenses 
or permits for the erection of structures on the seabed on the outer 
Continental Shelf. Congress retained for the federal government the 
exclusive power to authorize or prohibit specific uses of the seabed 
 111 16 U.S.C.A. § 1811 (Westlaw 2011). 
 112 16 U.S.C.A. § 1856(a)(1) (Westlaw 2011). 
 113 Nantucket Sound is surrounded on three ‘sides’ by mainland Massachusetts, Cape Cod, 
and the islands of Martha’s Vineyard and Nantucket. On the remaining side is a channel that 
connects the Sound to the open ocean and federal waters. Only the area of Horseshoe Shoals—at the 
deep center of Nantucket Sound—is outside the reach of the three-mile boundary from any of the 
Massachusetts shorelines that surround it. 
 114 See United States v. Maine, 475 U.S. 89 (1986). 
 115 16 U.S.C.A. § 1856(a)(2)(B) (Westlaw 2011). 
 116 Ten Taxpayer Citizens Grp. v. Cape Wind Assocs., LLC, 373 F.3d 183, 190 (1st Cir. 
2004). 
 117 43 U.S.C.A. § 1333(a)(2) (Westlaw 2011). 
 118 Ten Taxpayer, 373 F.3d at 193. 
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beyond three miles from shore. If adopted and enforced on the outer 
Continental Shelf, statutes . . . [that] require the approval of state 
agencies prior to construction . . . would effectively grant state 
governments a veto power over the disposition of the national seabed. 
That result is fundamentally inconsistent with the OCSLA.119 
Moreover, the court noted that the regulatory agency with authority 
for one of the two relevant permitting schemes had specifically 
disclaimed authority in this case.120 The dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims 
was affirmed, with the court holding that “any Massachusetts permit 
requirement that might apply to [the data tower] is inconsistent with 
federal law and thus inapplicable on Horseshoe Shoals under the 
OCSLA.”121 In the end, Ten Taxpayers leaves no room for doubt that the 
federal government maintains exclusive authority for permitting in the 
OCS. 
B.  AUTHORITY TO CONSIDER IN-STATE IMPACTS OF FEDERAL 
ACTIVITY (IN FEDERAL WATERS) 
i.  Public Trust 
The Public Trust Doctrine (PTD)122 provides that: 
[P]ublic trust lands, waters and living resources in a State are held by 
the State in trust for the benefit of all of the people, and establishes the 
right of the public to full enjoy public trust lands, waters and living 
resources for a wide variety of recognized public uses. The doctrine 
also sets limitations on the States, the public, and private owners, as 
well as establishing the responsibilities of the States when managing 
these public trust assets.123 
 119 Ten Taxpayer, 373 F.3d at 196-97 (citations omitted). 
 120 Id. at 195. 
 121 Id. at 197. 
 122 “Under this doctrine, which has evolved from ancient Roman and English common law, 
governments have an obligation to protect the interests of the general public (as opposed to the 
narrow interests of specific users or any particular group) in tidelands and in the water column and 
submerged lands below navigable waters.” U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy, Primer on Ocean 
Jurisdictions: Drawing Lines in the Water 41 (pre-publication copy). 
 123 COASTAL STATES ORGANIZATION, PUTTING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO WORK: THE 
APPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO THE MANAGEMENT OF LANDS, WATERS AND 
LIVING RESOURCES OF THE COASTAL STATE 1 (2d ed. June 1997), available at 
media.coastalstates.org/Public%20Trust%20Doctrine%202nd%20Ed%20%201997%20CSO.pdf. 
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Numerous federal and state cases have reaffirmed the validity of the 
PTD over time, including the seminal case of Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. 
Illinois (1892), which acknowledged states’ rights and responsibilities 
with respect to their jurisdictional waters and held that no state can divest 
its duties under the PTD.124 
Today, the 1900-year-old concept of sovereign ownership of tidelands 
subject to a public trust is still among the most important and far-
reaching doctrines in American property law, for two reasons. First, 
by virtue of holding public property rights out to the 3-mile limit of 
the U.S. territorial sea, each coastal state has far greater latitude in 
protecting societal interests than is generally the case on land, where 
most property is owned privately and government regulation must 
operate within the constitutional limits of the so-called “police 
power.” Second, American courts for more than three centuries have 
reiterated that the trust, as the word implies, is so solemn an obligation 
of government that it cannot be extinguished, even though title to the 
lands in question might be conveyed to private parties in certain 
circumstances.125 
ii.  Coastal Zone Management Act 
After a California oil spill in 1969, Congress passed a series of 
federal environmental laws, including NEPA and the CZMA. The 
CZMA126 established that “[t]here is a national interest in the effective 
management, beneficial use, protection, and development of the coastal 
zone.”127 It attempts to balance the competing needs and uses of 
resources within the coastal zone.128 The CZMA also encourages states 
to use their management planning such that “priority consideration 
[should be] given to coastal-dependent uses and orderly processes for 
siting major facilities related to national defense, energy, fisheries 
development, recreation, [and] ports and transportation,” among other 
things.129 
A key element of the CZMA and its implementation is the 
 124 Id.; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
 125 Dennis Ducsik, Mass. Office of Coastal Zone Mgmt., The Public Trust Doctrine in 
Massachusetts Coastal Law (2008), available at www.mass.gov/czm/coastlines/ 
2008/ebbflow/trust.htm. 
 126 16 U.S.C.A. § 1451 et seq. (Westlaw 2011). 
 127 16 U.S.C.A. § 1451(a) (Westlaw 2011). 
 128 16 U.S.C.A. § 1452(1), (2) (Westlaw 2011). 
 129 16 U.S.C.A. § 1452(2)(D) (Westlaw 2011). 
24
Golden Gate University Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 8
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/gguelj/vol5/iss1/8
07_KIMMELL PRINTER VERSION 9/24/2011  6:29:41 PM 
2011] OFFSHORE WIND ENERGY PROJECT 221 
state
 
establishment of “enforceable program policies” by participating states. 
States’ coastal program policies are “enforceable” because they derive 
authority from existing state statutes and regulations. With a CZM-
approved Coastal Management Plan (CMP), states may consider in-state 
impacts of federal activities in federal waters and determine whether 
these activities are consistent with the states’ CMPs through CZM’s 
consistency review provisions.130 
The CZMA requires that federal agency activities be consistent with 
state CMPs. However, the degree to which individual proponents of a 
project must comply with state coastal policies varies. For example, 
while the federal government must comply “to the maximum extent 
practicable,”131 a private party bears a heavier burden. A federal 
government agency must prepare a “consistency determination” to 
demonstrate to a state that it complies with the coastal policy.132 
However, private applicants for federal license or permit activities,133 
applicants for OCSLA Plans,134 and applicants for federal financial 
assistance activities135 must certify to the affected states that the 
proposed activities are consistent with the enforceable policies of the 
 CMP.136 
At least as to private parties, the CZMA has teeth.137 If CZM does 
not concur with a party’s “consistency certification,” the project cannot 
obtain permits or licenses from any federal agency.138 There are 
timelines after which applications are presumptively approved,139 and the 
statute contains provisions for appealing to the Secretary of Commerce to 
override disapproval by a state on the basis that the proposed activity “is 
consistent with the objectives of [the CZMA] or is otherwise necessary 
in the interest of national security.”140 Nevertheless, the CZM 
 130 16 U.S.C.A. § 1456 et seq. (Westlaw 2011). 
 131 16 U.S.C.A. § 1456(c)(1)(C) (Westlaw 2011). 
 132 Id. 
 133 16 U.S.C.A. § 1456(c)(3)(A) (Westlaw 2011). 
 134 16 .U.S.C.A. § 1456(c)(3)(B) (Westlaw 2011). 
 135 16 U.S.C.A. § 1456(d) (Westlaw 2011). 
 136 16 U.S.C.A. § 1456(c)(3) (Westlaw 2011). 
 137 As of March 2010, there were 141 state appeals of consistency review determinations. Of 
those, thirty-two were dismissed or overridden by the Secretary of Commerce on procedural 
grounds, and forty-four were heard. Of the appeals that were heard, the Secretary of Commerce 
decided to override the state objections in only fourteen cases. See Appeals to the Secretary of 
Commerce Under the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) (Mar. 10, 2010), available at 
coastalmanagement.noaa.gov/consistency/media/appealslist.pdf. 
 138 16 U.S.C.A. § 1456(c)(3)(A) (Westlaw 2011). 
 139 16 U.S.C.A. § 1456(c)(3)(A), (B)(ii) (Westlaw 2011). 
 140 16 U.S.C.A. § 1456(c)(3)(A), (B)(iii) (Westlaw 2011). 
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consistency review offers significant potential for states wanting to exert 
greater control over activit
ate coastal resources. 
Although it had been clearly established in Ten Taxpayers that the 
federal government has exclusive permitting authority over Cape Wind’s 
wind farm since it would be located in federal waters, Cape Wind still 
had to obtain approval for the undersea transmission cables that are 
necessary to bring the wind energy to the power grid on land.141 As noted 
previously, the Cape Cod Commission had denied approval of the cables, 
and Cape Wind applied to the Massachusetts Energy Facilities Siting 
Board (EFSB)142 for a certificate of environmental im
est to override the Cape Cod Commission’s denial. 
The Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound intervened in the EFSB 
proceeding. It had no serious objection to the cables, which in all 
material respects would be identical to several other electric cables that 
already run from the mainland of Cape Cod to Nantucket and Martha’s 
Vineyard. The Alliance objected to the turbines in federal waters. Having 
lost the Ten Taxpayer litigation, the Alliance did not claim that the Siting 
Board had jurisdiction per se over the turbines. Instead, the Alliance 
made a subtle and nuanced argument designed to overcome Ten 
Taxpayers using a different strategy. This time, the Alliance claimed that 
while the Siting Board’s jurisdiction was limited to the cable, the Board 
could, and indeed must, consider the impacts of the wind farm on 
Massachusetts waters. In the Alliance’s view, the Board could refuse to 
permit the cable if it concluded that the wind farm itself would cause 
unacceptable impacts. To bolster this approach, the Alliance filed a 
motion to expand the scope of the EFSB proceedings to include 
consideration of the wind farm (o
in Massachusetts waters).143 
Cape Wind and the Conservation Law Foundation, a nonprofit 
environmental group that supports the project, filed motions to exclude 
evidence of impacts from the wind farm and confirm that the Siting 
Board’s jurisdiction was over the cable only.144 Abiding by the state’s 
 141 Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd., 932 N.E.2d 787, 
791-92 (Mass. 2010). 
 142 EFSB’s mandate is “to provide a reliable energy supply for the commonwealth with a 
minimum impact on the environment at the lowest possible cost.” MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164, 
§ 69H (Westlaw 2011). 
 143 Mass. Energy Facilities Siting Bd., EFSB 07-8, Ruling on Motions Re EFSB Jurisdiction 
Relative to DRI Decisions and on Motions Re Scope of Proceeding 7 (July 28, 2008), available at 
www.capecodtoday.com/downloads/jurisdiction_0728.pdf. 
 144 Id. at 7-8. 
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prior decisions during the environmental review, the Siting Board 
confirmed that its jurisdiction was limited to the cables and that it did not 
have the authority to review the wind farm.145 Thus, the Siting Board 
refused to admit expert testimony from the Alliance on the impacts of the 
wind farm,146 and ultimately issued a certificate for the cable. The 
Alliance appealed to a single justice of the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Cou
sition. 
On appeal, the Alliance challenged the EFSB’s decision to issue its 
omnibus “certificate” on a variety of grounds. The most potent objection 
was its claim that the Siting Board had abdicated its public trust 
responsib
.147 
The Alliance decried what it saw as a false segmenting of the 
project into discrete components (e.g., the federal component including 
the turbines, and the state component as limited to the transmission 
lines.), challenging EFSB’s “‘semantic fiction’ of a stand-alone 
‘transmission project.’”148 They attempted to distinguish Ten Taxpayers, 
arguing that the case did not address a state’s 
 impacts of the project in federal waters.149 
In a 5-2 decision, the court rejected the Alliance’s challenge. The 
court held that the Siting Board’s governing statute limited its review to 
the project for which the proponent sought a license, in this case, the 
electric cables. The court also reasoned that if the Board did what the 
Alliance requested—review the impacts of the wind farm and deny or 
condition the electric cable on that basis—it would in effect be asserting 
jurisdiction over the cable, in violation of Ten Taxpayers. In other words, 
the Board would do indirectly (deny the cable a permit and thereby kill 
the project) what it could not do directly (assert jurisdiction over the 
wind farm).150 The court also relied heavily on the fact that the project 
“has undergone extensive scrutiny by Federal and State agencies.”151 The 
 145 Id. at 9-10. 
 146 Mass. Energy Facilities Siting Bd., EFSB 07-8, Final Decision on the Matter of the 
Petition of Cape Wind Associates, LLC for a Certificate of Environmental Impact and Public 
Interest 7-8 (May 27, 2009), available at www.env.state.ma.us/dpu/docs/siting/efsb07-
8/52709cwford.pdf. 
 147 Brief of the Towns of Aquinnah, Chilmark and Edgartown as Amicus [sic] Curiae at 10, 
Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd., 932 N.E.2d 787 (Mass. 
2010) (No. SJC 01596). 
 148 Id. at 18, 20. 
 149 Id. at 24, 25. 
 150 Alliance, 932 N.E.2d at 804-05. 
 151 Id. at 805. 
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court specifically acknowledged that Cape Wind had been subjected to 
NEPA review, and that the CZM certified that the entire Cape Wind 
project will be consistent with Massachusetts’ CMP.152 The CZM 
certification was particularly relevant, because CZM, a state agency, 
performed precisely the review that the Alliance claimed was needed—to 
examine the in-state impacts of the wind farm to ensure that the wind 
 was consistent with the state’s protective laws. 
In a searing dissent, then-Chief Justice Marshall expressed her 
disagreement with the court’s ruling regarding public trust matters, 
noting that a “wind farm today may be a drilling rig or nuclear power 
plant tomorrow.”153 She expressed concern about the broader precedent 
of undermining the state’s public trust obligations and argued that a more 
thorough consideration of in-state impacts would not necessarily be 
preempted by federal law (“Comity within our Federal system has more 
meaning than the court’s crabbed approach.”).154 Finally, overlooking 
the crucial role that CZM played in assessing the impact of the wind 
turbines on state waters, Justice Marshall contended that the court’s 
decision casts the public trust doctrine and government energy polic
sition and “exalts regulatory expediency at the cost of fiduciary 
obligation.”155 
While the jurisdictional issue was a close call, as reflected by the 
divided court, the majority had the better argument when one considers 
the overriding federal interest in developing offshore wind energy. It 
serves public policy goals for wind facilities to be located as far offshore 
as possible to avoid interfering with near-shore uses of water bodies and 
arousing public opposition. This means locating wind facilities in federal 
waters, more than three miles from shore. Every such facility will require 
a cable through state waters to transmit the electricity. Were Justice 
Marshall’s opinion accepted by the majority, every state could use its 
permitting authority over the electric cable as an indirect means of 
blocking a wind farm in federal waters. This would be akin to giving 
each state a veto over its respective segment of a national highway or an 
interstate gas pipeline. The result would inevitably thwart the national 
goal of developing offshore wind as an alternative energy source. In 
contrast, the majority opinion does not hand the state an indirect veto 
over wind farms in federal waters. However, states still have a significant 
say, both as participants in the federal environmental review process and 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. at 816 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting). 
 154 Id. at 823-24. 
 155 Id. at 824. 
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of Commerce to overturn such decisions when significant national 
 
IV. 
en state and federal authorities), clearly 
illustrates the need for significant reform if we are to have a robust 
offshore wind energy industry. 
 
through their coastal zone management authorities. Those authorities can 
deny a consistency certif
interests are implicated.
CONCLUSION 
As of the date of this writing, Cape Wind’s prospects look 
favorable. All of the federal and state permits have been acquired, though 
the former are currently on appeal. Cape Wind has signed a contract to 
sell half of its output to a Massachusetts utility company and is actively 
seeking buyers for the other half of the electricity. Thus, notwithstanding 
all of the legislative obstacles, permitting delays, and litigation, Cape 
Wind is moving closer to construction. However, its apparent success is 
in spite of, not because of, our laws and regulatory processes. The Cape 
Wind experience, while helpful in resolving certain issues (such as the 
allocation of jurisdiction betwe
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